

SOPHRONISCUS' SON IS APPROACHING:
PORPHYRY, *ISAGOGE* 7.20–1*

In a well-known passage of the *Isagoge* Porphyry presents his conception of the individual as a collection of properties. In Busse's edition (*CAG* IV.1, 7.19–24) the text runs as follows:¹

ἄτομον δὲ λέγεται ὁ Σωκράτης καὶ τουτὶ τὸ λευκὸν καὶ οὗτος δὲ προσίων Σωφρονίσκου υἱός, εἰ μόνος αὐτῷ εἴη Σωκράτης υἱός. ἄτομα οὖν λέγεται τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὅτι ἐξ ἰδιοτήτων συνέστηκεν ἕκαστον, ὧν τὸ ἄθροισμα οὐκ ἂν ἐπ' ἄλλου ποτέ τὸ αὐτὸ γένοιτο. αἱ γὰρ Σωκράτους ἰδιότητες οὐκ ἂν ἐπ' ἄλλου τινὸς τῶν κατὰ μέρος γένοιτο ἂν αἱ αὐταί, κτλ.

We call an individual Socrates and this white thing and this approaching son of Sophroniscus, if Socrates were his only son. Such things are called individuals because each is composed of peculiar properties, whose collection could never come into being as the same in anything else. For Socrates' peculiar properties could not come into being as the same in any other of the particulars, etc.

Porphyry's doctrine of the individual² is the subject of several acute and learned studies,³ to which I shall not try to add anything substantial. But I do have something to say about the instances of individuals (or of expressions that refer to individuals) listed in the passage, more precisely about the phrase οὗτος δὲ προσίων Σωφρονίσκου υἱός at lines 20–1. According to the apparatus, the only (apparently minor) trouble with the transmission of these words is that MS B⁴ adds the article ὁ before Σωφρονίσκου. To my mind, however, Busse's text hides a corruption. There are at least two reasons for believing so.

(1) The qualification 'if Socrates were his only son', which immediately follows in the text, clearly should have the function of ensuring that the previous description refers to only one thing. But, according to our text, the previous description is 'this *approaching* son of Sophroniscus'. Therefore description and qualification do not fit well together. On the one hand, the description would seem to require a qualification like 'if Socrates were his only *approaching* son'; on the other hand, the qualification seems to presuppose a description like 'the son of Sophroniscus'. More precisely, 'if Socrates were his only son' states a *sufficient*, but not a *necessary* condition for 'this approaching son of Sophroniscus' to refer to only one thing.

(2) A second problem consists in the pronoun 'this' (οὗτος: more precisely 'this here'), which so far I have not taken into account. This strong demonstrative is actually sufficient to ensure the uniqueness of the description's referent. Never mind how many sons Sophroniscus has or how many of them are approaching; even if a horde of sons of Sophroniscus were approaching, 'this here' (presumably accompanied by an osten-

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¹ The text is reprinted without changes and translated in A. de Libera and A. Ph. Segonds, *Porphyre: Isagoge* (Paris, 1998).

² The *Isagoge* passage must be compared with other related texts: see at least Porph. in *Cat.* 129.9–10; Dexipp. in *Cat.* 30.20–6; Simpl. in *Cat.* 55.3–5, 229.16–8; Philop. in *An. Po.* 437.11–438.2. It is also instructive to read the ancient commentaries on the *Isagoge*: Ammon. in *Porph.* 89.18–90.23; Elias 76.2–11; David 167.18–171.22; ps.-Elias §38.11–16; Boeth. in *Porph.*² 233.20–236.6 Brandt. On their importance for the text of our passage see below.

³ See first and foremost R. Chiaradonna, 'La teoria dell'individuo in Porfirio e l'*ΙΔΙΩΣ ΠΟΙΟΝ* stoico', *Elenchos* 21 (2000), 303–31. See also P. Hadot, *Porphyre et Victorinus* (Paris, 1968), 1.131, 2.99, n. 4; R. Sorabji, *Matter, Space and Motion. Theories in Antiquity and Their Sequel* (London, 1988), 44–59; A. C. Lloyd, *The Anatomy of Neoplatonism* (Oxford, 1990), 43–7.

⁴ B = Parisinus Coislinianus 387 (tenth–eleventh century).

sive gesture) suffices to convey a reference to only one of them—as with the preceding ‘this white thing here’ (τουτὶ τὸ λευκόν), to which no qualification is added, because none is needed.⁵ Therefore the qualification ‘if Socrates were his only son’ now appears to be altogether superfluous. Indeed, yet a further problem arises. If the demonstrative ensures uniqueness of reference, why does Porphyry take pains to attach it to so complex a description as ‘approaching son of Sophroniscus’?

I think we should therefore print the text as follows:

ἄτομον δὲ λέγεται ὁ Σωκράτης καὶ τουτὶ τὸ λευκὸν καὶ οὗτος ὁ προσίων <καὶ ὁ>
Σωφρονίσκου υἱός, εἰ μόνος αὐτῷ εἶη Σωκράτης υἱός.

We call an individual Socrates and this white thing *and this approaching man* <and the> son of *Sophroniscus*, if Socrates were his only son.

This supplement seems to solve all our problems. The problematic description ‘this approaching son of Sophroniscus’ splits up into two autonomous descriptions. The former, namely ‘this approaching man’ (οὗτος ὁ προσίων), contains the demonstrative ‘this’ without any qualification being added. The latter, namely ‘the son of Sophroniscus’ (ὁ Σωφρονίσκου υἱός), contains no demonstrative but is provided with a perfectly fitting qualification. Indeed, there is also the further advantage that the former description turns out to take over an Aristotelian example, τὸ προσίων or ὁ προσίων, which occurs in similar contexts: see *Soph. El.* 24 *passim* and *An. Pr.* 43a35–6 (where τὸ προσίων is tellingly associated with τὸ λευκὸν ἐκεῖνο).⁶

Immediately after stating this proposal I am bound to acknowledge that it is not really my own. An almost identical conjecture was already advanced by Pacius in his 1597 edition.⁷ Pacius translates our passage as follows:

Individuum autem dicitur Socrates, & Hoc album, & Hic qui accedit, & Sophronisci filius, si modo solus ei Socrates filius sit.

He appends a note to the & before *Sophronisci*:

⁵ Cf. 2.17–18 ‘Of predicates some are said of only one thing, namely individuals, for example Socrates and “this (man)” and “this (thing)” (ὡς τὰ ἅτομα οἶον Σωκράτης καὶ τὸ οὗτος καὶ τὸ τοῦτο)’.

⁶ *CQ*’s anonymous reader suggests a defence of Busse’s text: ‘It does seem to me to be *possible* that “the son of Sophroniscus who is approaching” would only definitely identify Socrates if Socrates was indeed Sophroniscus’s only son. If he wasn’t, then just the same expression would be used either way, and the witness might not be able to identify which person was identified through it . . . without the addition of “if Socrates is his only son” the description *could* fit any of an unknown number, and so doesn’t pick out one in particular. Adding “I mean the one that is approaching” doesn’t help to specify which it is until the appearance is no longer ambiguous.’ I have two replies. (i) What is relevant to Porphyry’s passage is not our *knowledge* of the referent’s identity, but only the referent’s uniqueness. Cf. the parallel ‘this white thing here’, to which no qualification is attached: this may turn out to be ambiguous with respect to the referent’s identity, but surely it has a unique referent, and that is enough. (ii) In any case, ‘if Socrates were his only son’ states a sufficient but not necessary condition, *not only* for ‘this approaching son of Sophroniscus’ to refer to only one thing, *but also* for a hearer to know its identity: what is necessary and sufficient to know is just that Socrates is Sophroniscus’ only *approaching* son. Therefore, even if the reader’s worries were relevant to our passage, the qualification would state too strong a condition and would not fit the description. Perhaps the reader takes ‘approaching’ as a mere gloss on the pronoun ‘this’. But it must instead be a proper part of the description, like ‘son of Sophroniscus’, as it is natural to think and as the Aristotelian passages confirm.

⁷ *Aristotelis Stagiritae Peripateticorum Principis Organum* Iul. Pacius recensuit, Editio Secunda (Francofurti, 1597), 13.

Lego, καὶ Σωφρονίσκου υἱός, ut hoc sit exemplum individui diversum a precedente οὐτοσί ὁ προσιών: ne Porphyrius videatur frustra adiicere, εἰ μόνος &c. quia demonstratio illa, οὐτοσί ὁ προσιών, satis distinguit Socratem a fratribus, si forte fratres habeat.

Thus before Σωφρονίσκου in line 20 Pacius supplied just <καὶ>, rather than <καὶ ὁ> as I would prefer to do.

Actually, however, the conjecture is neither mine nor Pacius'. It is, in fact, no conjecture at all: for it turns out to find confirmation in part of the very tradition of the *Isagoge*.

I shall not attach much weight to the fact that B's reading οὐτοσί ὁ προσιών ὁ Σωφρονίσκου υἱός might (but need not) be a remnant of an original reading with καὶ ὁ. Much more important is the confirmation coming from the indirect tradition. Let us begin with Boethius' translation of the passage. As printed by Minio-Paluello (*Aristoteles Latinus* I.6–7, 13.21–3, here agreeing with previous editions⁸ apart from a minor detail of word order), Boethius' text is as follows:

individuum autem dicitur Socrates et hoc-album et hic-veniens, ut Sophronisci filius, si solus ei sit Socrates filius.

But a glance at the apparatus shows that *ut* is the reading of all testimonies except *LgHeKö*,⁹ which read *et*. The text with *et* seems to me clearly correct (indeed, *ut* does not seem to make much sense) and is a perfect Latin translation of Porphyry's text with my supplement.

That Boethius read καὶ οὐτοσί ὁ προσιών καὶ ὁ Σωφρονίσκου υἱός in the *Isagoge* is confirmed by his larger commentary, 233.20–234.13 Brandt. See especially lines 233.20–234.6:

Individua autem de singulis praedicantur, ut Socrates et Plato, eaque maxime sunt individua quae sub ostensionem indicationemque digiti cadunt, ut hoc scamnum, *hic veniens* atque quae ex aliqua proprie accidentium designantur nota, ut, si quis Socratem significatione velit ostendere, non dicat 'Socrates', ne sit alius qui forte hoc nomine nuncupetur, sed dicat 'Sophronisci filius', si unicus Sophronisco fuit.

If from Boethius we turn to the Greek commentators, we see that none attests to the reading printed by Busse. Indeed, three of them (Ammon. *in Porph.* 90.16–23; Elias 76.2–11; ps.-Elias §38.11–16), in supplying examples of the accidents whose collection constitutes the individual, refer to the fact that Socrates is Sophroniscus' son without mentioning 'this approaching man'. What is more, David (sixth century A.D.) has this to say about the qualification 'if Socrates were his only son' (*in Porph.* 171.10–12):

Καλῶς εἶπεν 'εἰ μόνος αὐτῷ ἐστι Σωκράτης υἱός'. εἰ γὰρ ἔστι καὶ ἄλλος, τότε τὸν Σωκράτην οὐ δηλοῖ, ἀλλ' ἀόριστον υἱὸν λέγει, τὰ δέ γε ἅτομα <οὐκ> ἀόριστα.¹⁰

He said well 'if Socrates is his only son'. For if there is another one, then [sc. the description] does not indicate Socrates, but speaks of an indefinite son, whereas individuals are <not> indefinite.

⁸ Namely those by Busse and Brandt (in his edition of Boethius' larger commentary, *CSEL* 48).

⁹ *Lg* = Petropolitanus (*olim* Leninopolitanus), bibl. nat. (*olim* bibl. publ.) F. V. class. lat. 7: ninth century. *He* = Parisinus lat. 12949: ninth century. *Kö* = Coloniensis, bibl. Eccl. Metropol. CXCI: eleventh century.

¹⁰ In line 12 <οὐκ> is my supplement, which seems necessary to the meaning.

David's point seems to be that the qualification is necessary because, if Sophroniscus had more than one son, then the description would refer to something like a *generic* son of Sophroniscus. This clearly suggests that the description at issue is 'the son of Sophroniscus', and that therefore David had καὶ ὁ Σωφρονίσκου υἱός in his Porphyry. So, I think, should we.¹¹

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¹¹ When this paper had already been submitted to *CQ* Jonathan Barnes published a new translation of the *Isagoge*, with a commentary (*Porphyry: Introduction* [Oxford, 2003]). I am glad to acknowledge that at p. 150 he mentions the variant in Boethius' translation and avers that 'This last text is surely what Porphyry wrote', referring to Arist. *An. Pr.* 43a35–6 and *Al. Aphr. in An. Pr.* 291.8. He translates accordingly: 'Socrates is said to be an individual, and so are *this* white thing, and *this* person approaching, and the son of Sophroniscus (should Socrates be his only son).'

THE CONSTANTINIAN ORIGIN OF JUSTINA (THEMISTIUS, *OR.* 3.43b)

καὶ διὰ τὸν ἡμέτερον οἰκιστὴν οὐ Γερμανοὶ καὶ Ἰάζυγες τοῖς πόνοις ἐντροφῶσι τῶν πάλοι 'Ρωμαίων, οὐδὲ τὸ σεμνὸν καὶ μέγα τῆς 'Ρώμης ὄνομα περιύβρισται παντάπασι καὶ ἐξαλλήλιπται, οὐδ' ἐς νόθους μετέστη διαδόχους καὶ παρασήμους, ἀλλ' εἰς τὸ γνήσιον αἷμα καὶ ἀκήρατον ἐπανήκει τῶν βασιλέων καὶ φυλάττεται ἡμῖν ἀλώβητος καὶ ἀκέραιος.¹

. . . and it is because of our [Constantinople's] founder that the Germans and Jazygi do not luxuriate in the labours of the ancient Romans and that Rome's proud and mighty name has not been utterly abused nor has been erased or falls to bastard and spurious successors but has returned once more to the legitimate and unsullied blood line of the kings and is preserved for us intact and undefiled.²

It is in this way that Themistius thanks Constantius II (A.D. 337–61) for his defeat of the western usurper Magnentius (A.D. 350–3) during his ambassadorial speech on behalf of Constantinople delivered before the emperor himself in Rome in May A.D. 357. As has been duly noted in Heather and Moncur's recent translation and commentary, the reference to the Germans and Jazygi is a development of the claim that Magnentius was of barbarian origin, allegedly having been born to a British father and a Frankish mother.³ Although doubt has rightly been cast upon the reliability of such claims, Magnentius was certainly of low and obscure origin for such propaganda to have gained the hold that it did.⁴ The significance of what Themistius says next, however, has passed unnoticed. Since Constantius saved Rome by defeating Magnentius, then the 'bastard and spurious successors' from whom he also saved it are recognizable as the successors of Magnentius, his future children. The interesting point here is their description as 'bastard' successors in contrast to the 'legitimate and unsullied blood line' represented by Constantius. This concedes

¹ Ed. H. Schenkl and G. Downey, *Themistii Orationes Quae Supersunt* 1 (Leipzig, 1965), 61.

² Trans. P. Heather and D. Moncur, *Politics, Philosophy, and Empire in the Fourth Century: Select Orations of Themistius*, Translated Texts for Historians 36 (Liverpool, 2001), 128.

³ *Epit. de Caes.* 42.7; *Zos. HN* 2.46.3, 54.1; *Zonar.* 13.6.1.

⁴ See J. F. Drinkwater, 'The revolt and ethnic origin of the usurper Magnentius (350–53), and the rebellion of Vetranio (350)', *Chiron* 30 (2000), 131–59.